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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PIaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 19533 
ROBERT EUGENE JONES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AS TO POINTS I, II, AND III 
This brief is directed to the argument initially raised in 
the opening brief of appellant concerning jury instructions, 
selection of jurors, and prosecutor misconduct. The brief of 
the Attorney General in response to this opening brief was 
filed on April 15, 1985. Subsequently through the stipulation 
of the Attorney General and appellant's counsel, the case was 
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings as to 
appellant's claim that the prosecutor withheld a police report 
from the defense attorneys which showed the custody of the 
murder weapon and negated all of the needless testimony at 
trial concerning the identity of the weapon. Since this was a 
point which was unknown during the writing of the original 
brief, a supplemental appellant's brief has been filed on Point 
IV alone. It is expected that the Attorney General will write 
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a responding brief to Point IV alone. If time permits, a reply 
brief as to Point IV will also be submitted by appellant. 
Before reexamining the individual points of appeal, a gen-
eral statement should be made on behalf of appellant. The 
State argues in its brief the principle that jury instructions 
must be examined as a whole in determining whether a jury has 
been properly instructed. (Response brief, p. 17.) Likewise, 
a similar principle applies in reviewing the contentions of a 
criminal appellant. The cumulative effect of the combined 
errors claimed by an appellant must be evaluated in determining 
whether a fair trial occurred. State v. Whalon, 464 P.2d 730 
(Wash. App. 1970). Even though one single error in and of 
itself may be insufficient for reversal, a combination of four 
or five such errors can rise to the level requiring a new 
trial. State v. Budinich, 562 P.2d 1006 (Wash. App. 1977). 
In the instant case the respondent Attorney General does 
not contest that certain errors were made in the jury instruc-
tions. The key "knowing" element was omitted from the first 
degree and attempted first degree instruction. A wrongful 
"reckless" term was included in the second degree charge and 
attempted second degree charge as well as the omission of other 
language relating to a crime during a robbery. Thus, there is 
no question that the instructions themselves were erroneous. 
The only question is what effect such instructions had upon the 
jury. 
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There is also no doubt that two of the jurors were 
acquainted with relatives of the victims. One juror had even 
gone to the viewing of the victim and had discussed the cir-
cumstances surrounding his death with the victim's sister. It 
is undisputed that both of these jurors expressed their desire 
not to serve on the jury because of their intimate association 
with the family. 
Third, the record is clear that the prosecutor made many 
statements concerning defendant's mental health which were not 
supported by the evidence and which could only be interpreted 
as an attempt to prejudice the defendant. Again, while these 
statements standing alone may not be grounds for reversal, the 
accumulative effect clearly tainted defendant's trial and 
requires reversal. 
Finally, an examination of the supplemental brief shows 
that the prosecutor failed to produce a critical police report 
to the defense attorneys at the time of trial. The record 
shows an enormous amount of time being spent by both the 
defense and the prosecution in an attempt to connect the 
acknowledged murder weapon to one of two weapons purchased by 
the defendant, one of which was given as a gift to Beverly 
Jones. The prosecutor knew at the time of trial that the 
murder weapon belonged to neither, and was in fact a third gun 
which had been purchased by a third party and pawned by another 
third party after the killing. Neither of the third parties 
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testified at trial. It is evident from reading the record that 
the defense attorneys believed the murder weapon was one of the 
two guns originally purchased by the defendant and spent much 
effort trying to convince the jury it was the gun given by the 
defendant as a gift to Beverly Jones. 
The Attorney General can speculate as to what the jury 
believed from the jury instructions; can speculate as to the 
impartiality of the prospective jurors who knew the victim's 
family; can hypothesize as to the effect the prosecutor's argu-
ment of mental competency would have upon the jury; and can 
surmise what the defense would have done with the missing 
police report had they had it. However, this speculation is 
hardly a substitution for a fair and impartial trial, espe-
cially when the defendant is now faced with life imprisonment. 
While defendant acknowledges that he is not entitled to a per-
fect trial, the combination of all of these errors certainly 
raises this trial above the threshold of permissible errors. 
This combination of deliberate misconduct or accidental omis-
sion requires that a new trial be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in respondent's brief is 
essentially supported by the record. (Respondent's brief, 
pp. 2-9.) However, it should be noted that while respondent is 
entitled to view the evidence most favorably to the verdict, 
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for purposes of this appeal the evidence offered by defendant 
must also be considered. The statement of facts of the respon-
dent contains the version of facts stated by Beverly Jones and 
her family and friends. The statement completely ignores facts 
testified to by Jones and by his family and friends. In this 
case the question arises as to whether there is overwhelming 
evidence to convict the defendant or whether the facts are so 
close that an error could have made a significant difference. 
The omission of this second line of testimony is therefore 
material. 
The physical evidence in this case is completely incon-
clusive* A review of the medical testimony, for example, is 
inconclusive for proving or disproving either Beverly Jones' 
version or Roberts Jones' version of the shooting. Likewise, 
the ballistic evidence and other physical evidence is con-
sistent with either story. 
Essentially, this entire case evolved on the credibility of 
Beverly Jones and Robert Jones. It is only these two individu-
als who are alive to testify as to what truly happened in the 
basement of the Chapman apartment on March 11, 1983. 
One factual correction should also be made. Respondent in 
its brief states that defendant admitted that the murder weapon 
"was one of two .38 handguns that he had purchased in 1982." 
(Respondent's brief, p. 9.) The word "admit" is improper 
here. Defendant believed that the gun used in the killing was 
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the gun he had given to Beverly Jones. Beverly Jones, on the 
other hand, testified she believed that the gun was the one 
which Jones kept for himself. As the facts later evolved from 
the missing police report, however, neither of these guns was 
the weapon. It was a third gun which actually killed Chapman, 
as the prosecution well knew. 
Both sides agree that the identity of the weapon that 
killed Chapman is extremely relevant to this case. However, 
the defense never made an issue of this point because of their 
mistaken belief that the murder weapon was one of the two guns 
purchased by defendant. 
In summary, the testimony supporting the defendant Robert 
Jones and that supporting Beverly Jones was about as diverse as 
one could imagine in any trial. Two complete different stories 
of the events before the killing and at the time of the shoot-
ing were given to the jury. Relevant facts were omitted in the 
trial concerned the identity of the weapon itself which the 
jury certainly should have considered in its deliberations and 
in deciding which version of the story to believe. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
The respondent concedes that the term "knowingly" was 
omitted from both the first degree and attempted first degree 
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instructions. (Respondent's brief, p. 12.) Respondent essen-
tially concedes that there were errors in the second degree 
murder and attempted second degree murder instructions. 
(Respondent's brief, p. 16.) Finally, respondent acknowledges 
that the burden of proof instruction was not contained in a 
single instruction but was contained in a number of instruc-
tions given by the lower court. (Respondent's brief, p. 16-17.) 
With these concessions in mind, respondent then attempts to 
second guess the jury by such statements as "the jury could not 
have misunderstood," (Respondent's brief, p. 12); "The jury 
could not possibly have convicted defendant of first degree 
murder and attempted first degree murder on the erroneous 
assumption that intent or knowledge was required with respect 
to Kim Chapman's death but not with respect to Beverly's risk 
of death," (Respondent's brief, p. 15); and "the only rational 
inference to be drawn from the jury's verdict of guilty is that 
they applied the intent element to both the element of Kim's 
death and Beverly's risk of death." (Respondent's brief, 
P. 15.) 
Respondent's speculation is interesting but certainly does 
not overcome the counter-speculation that the jury rejected the 
defendant's defenses because of confusion or misunderstanding 
resulting from the improper instructions. Defendant's version 
of the incident could have resulted in his complete acquittal 
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or conviction for manslaughter, second degree murder, first 
degree murder, attempted second degree murder, or attempted 
first degree murder. It is impossible to hypothesize as to 
what effect these erroneous instructions had upon the jury's 
consideration of these various charges since, for example, they 
may have found defendant guilty of second degree murder or 
attempted second degree murder had the instruction been given 
properly but, because the instruction was not proper, were 
forced to fit the factual context into the first degree murder 
definition. 
Respondent cites the case of State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1042 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that where the evidence 
overwhelmingly supports conviction under one variation of crime 
submitted to a jury, the reversal of the conviction is not 
necessary even if there were erroneous instructions on another 
variation. (Respondent's brief, p. 16.) A review of this 
court's decision in that case shows that prejudicial error does 
not occur when there is "abundant evidence—both eye witness 
testimony and physical evidence—from which the jury could 
conclude that defendant" was guilty of a crime. Under no 
stretch of the imagination can the evidence in this case be 
said to be "overwhelming" to prove defendant's guilt and, 
therefore, these erroneous instructions cannot be ignored as 
harmless error. Nor should that principle apply where the 
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erroneous instructions are those relating to specific defenses, 
as was the case here. 
Finally, respondent claims that the burden of proof 
instructions were adequate since they were covered throughout 
the various instructions cited by respondent. However, even 
reviewing all of these instructions collectively, there is no 
instruction which states that the burden of proof never shifts 
to a defendant or that if the jury viewed the evidence in the 
case as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions, guilt 
or innocence, the jury must find the defendant innocent. The 
fact, for instance, that instruction No. 35 informed the jury 
that defendant had no burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he acted in self-defense is hardly the same thing as 
informing the jury that the defendant has no burden whatsoever 
to prove anything in the case imposed against him. 
Thus, the instructions to the jury were erroneous and when 
combined with the other errors, were clearly prejudicial. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN FAILING TO DISMISS TWO PROSPECTIVE JURORS 
FOR CAUSE. 
Respondent attempts to attack this claim of appellant on 
two fronts. First, it attempts to minimize the factual evi-
dence as to these two potential jurors. Second, it cites cases 
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allegedly finding that similar circumstances do not create 
prejudicial jurors. 
As to their factual attack, an examination of the very 
record which is attached to the State's brief shows that its 
factual assertions are incorrect. As to Miss Opheikens, the 
State would have this Court believe that she was "merely 
acquainted with the State's witness Earl Chapman." (Respon-
dent's brief, p. 21.) Further, other than "going to the view-
ing Miss Opheikens did not have any direct contact with the 
Chapman family." (Respondent's brief, p. 19.) 
The record shows that these characterizations are dis-
torted. First, Miss Opheikens stated that she knew the father 
of the victim Kim Chapman, as well as going to school with his 
daughters—the sisters of the victim. When asked if she could 
try the case on the merits and set aside any outside informa-
tion and acquaintances, she replied, "Probably." (Transcript, 
451-452). Thus, not only did Miss Opheikens know Mr. Chapman, 
but she also knew the victim's sisters. Next, Miss Opheikens 
stated that she discussed the case with members of the Chapman 
family at the viewing which included both Mr. Chapman, who 
testified at trial, and the older sister. When she was asked 
whether she was told about what happened or at least discussed 
it, she said, "Well, she just said how hard it was, and how the 
basement was in a mess, and they had to hire people to come in 
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and clean it up, things like that." (Record, p. 541.) In 
addition to those specific statements, the term "things like 
that" could include other even more prejudicial statements of 
which we are unaware. 
When asked whether the potential juror thought she would 
have to explain to the sister or other members of the Chapman 
family what she had done with her verdict, she said it would be 
hard to say. She was asked if it would be a problem if a deci-
sion was rendered in favor of defendant Robert Jones. She 
replied, "Yes, that would be hard, I think." (Record, p. 542). 
The additional testimony quoted in appellant's previous 
brief concerns her statements on several occasions that she 
would require Mr. Jones to prove her innocence to her. 
(Record, p. 546.) 
The facts concerning potential juror Barbara Shepherd are 
not as severe but nevertheless justified dismissing her for 
cause. The State mentions only part of her testimony. She 
hoped if she were chosen as a juror she wouldn't feel obligated 
to explain her verdict to her co-worker Cheryl Chapman, the 
wife of the victim's brother (Respondent's brief, p. 20.) 
Her actual interview before the Court, however, is much 
more revealing. First, she stated that she followed the case 
in the newspaper because she worked with the deceased, Kim-
Chapman's, sister-in-law. (Record, p. 524-525.) She next 
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stated that there "were comments out where I worked," and 
"people was following it through because we do work with 
Cheryl." (Record, p. 525.) When asked whether she could put 
aside anything she had read or discussed at work for the evi- . 
dence that came in trial, she replied, "I hope so." (Record, 
p. 525.) 
When asked whether she would be able to look at photographs 
concerning the body, she did not just reply she was skirmish 
about photographs, but stated, "Now that would be hard, because 
I see Cheryl every day. It would be hard. Let's put it that 
way." (Record, p. 528.) 
Finally, she was asked: 
Q Even though you have had this association out to 
work, do you think that you can sort of put that 
aside, or would you feel like you have to go back 
and answer to this gal depending on that your 
situation is, or explain to her why you did what 
you did? 
A I would hope not, but I do see her every day. 
Q You would really like not to serve on this jury; 
is that a fair statement? 
A That is a fair statement. 
(Record, p. 536.) 
With these factual statements now corrected, it remains 
to examine the law referred to by the respondent. First, it 
should be observed that in none of the cases cited by the state 
did all of these particular problems arise. In other words, 
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there is not one single case cited by respondent in which 
(1) one witness works with a close relative of the decedent and 
states that they would have a hard time serving on the jury 
because of this association; and (2) that another juror knows 
the victim's father and sisters very well; and (3) that that 
juror has gone to a funeral viewing and has discussed the cir-
cumstances of the basement and unknown facts with potential and 
actual witnesses; and (4) that potential juror has stated that 
she believes the defendant must prove his innocence. Again, 
the combination effect must be considered by this Court and 
even though in certain instances one of these claims may not be 
sufficient for reversal, the combination of these four juror 
claims, together with the other errors, certainly requires 
reversal. 
The State cites State v. Lacy, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983), 
to support the notion that merely an acquaintance with wit-
nesses does not require disqualification. In that case, how-
ever, the witnesses were third parties who had no emotional 
connection to the crime, whereas in this case those that were 
known were close relatives who obviously were emotionally 
involved because of the death. Also, the remaining factors 
enumerated in the preceding paragraph were absent. 
In Grizzle v. State, 559 P.2d 474 (Okl. Cr. 1977) (Respon-
dent's brief, p. 21), she did not know the victim's family, did 
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not discuss any of the evidentiary details with witnesses, and 
repeatedly said she could maintain an unbiased position. Here, 
Mrs. Opheikens herself knew the family, discussed evidentiary 
details with members of the family, and stated on several 
occasions that she would be biased against the defendant. 
The other cases relied upon by respondents are factually 
distinguishable in one way or another or, in the alternative, 
are sustainable only because they involve one of the claimed 
errors rather than a combination, as in this case. 
It is inconceivable why the lower court failed to excuse 
these two potential jurors in light of the vast pool of poten-
tial jurors available in this trial. The defense was forced to 
use two preemptory challenges to remove these two jurors. Any 
person accused of a murder would certainly feel more than 
uncomfortable having a juror who works with the victim's 
sister-in-law sitting on one side of the jury box while having 
a second juror who attended the victim's funeral, discussed the 
scene of the murder with witnesses not subject to cross-examin-
ation, and who declared the defendant's guilt, sitting on the 
other side of the jury box. It is for these reasons that this 
Court must remand this matter for a new trial in which a fair 
jury selection can occur. 
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POINT III 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
REQUIRES REVERSAL AND REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL. 
The highlights of the closing argument of the prosecutor 
have been set forth in appellant's opening brief (pp. 42-46.) 
Little additional comment needs to be made. The argument of 
the prosecutor went beyond refuting any claim that the defen-
dant was in a high state of mental stress at the time of the 
incident. Essentially the prosecutor gave his medical opinion 
as to defendant's prior conduct, i.e. that such conduct was no 
more than a facade and that he actually was not suffering from 
any mental stress or problems. It is one thing to comment upon 
the evidence but it is quite another thing to actually give a 
medical opinion as to the mental condition of defendant without 
evidence to support it. 
This Court has recently reaffirmed the proposition that 
when there is highly marginal evidence in a case the prosecu-
tor's prejudicial argument must be viewed much more strictly. 
State v. Andreason, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (May 6, 1986). 
Respondent contends that the evidence is overwhelming as to 
defendant's guilt and therefore any impropriety by the prosecu-
tor is harmless error. The evidence of first degree murder was 
only overwhelming if you overwhelmingly believe the testimony 
of Beverly Jones. Respondent lists a number of factors on 
pages 26 and 27 supposedly showing the overwhelming case 
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against defendant. However, appellant submits that none of 
this evidence is conclusive as to what occurred in the basement 
of the Chapman residence. There is no question that defendant 
was highly upset and that his conduct in the past was not that 
of a rational person. However, whether such conduct rose to 
the level of first degree murder, whether it was manslaughter 
or whether he was merely defending himself against Kim Chapman 
cannot be answered by any of the evidence cited by the respon-
dent . 
Appellant submits that a review of the medical testimony, 
as well as any other scientific testimony in this case, is 
completely inconclusive as to what actually occurred during the 
struggle between the two men. The only three persons who know 
the truth to this answer are the decedent, Robert Jones, and 
Beverly Jones. 
Inferences and hypotheticals are easy to make, but can be 
equally made for both the defense and the prosecution. The 
prosecutor argued, for example, that since no gun was found at 
the murder scene this indicates that defendant carried it out 
of the Chapman basement and also brought it in to shoot Kim and 
Beverly. First, even if defendant had carried out the weapon 
from the basement, it does not mean that he brought it in. 
Second, the evidence is clear that Beverly Jones was capable of 
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movement after the shooting and could easily have hidden the 
gun herself before the police arrived. 
The medical and scientific evidence is equally vague. It 
is interesting to note, for example, that no tests were even 
run on Kim Chapman's hands for indication of powder residue, 
since the prosecutor and police were so certain that their 
theory of the crime was correct. After defendant insisted 
these tests be run it was found that Kim Chapman indeed had 
evidence of powder residue on his hands, giving rise to an 
inference that he was closely involved with defendant in a 
struggle and not that defendant shot Chapman from a distance. 
In this type of case where intent, if nothing else, is a 
critical factor in determining the degree of guilt, it was 
improper for the prosecutor to add his own views on defendant's 
mental capacity and conduct in the past. While this may have 
been harmless error in certain cases, it certainly was not in 
the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
The three areas of error referred to in this brief and the 
opening brief of appellant merit reversal and a new trial. The 
additional error of failing to deliver a critical police report 
to defense attorneys adds additional frosting to the prejudi-
cial cake. There can be no doubt that the cumulative effect of 
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all of these errors denied defendant a fair trial which he was 
constitutionally entitled to receive. A review of the record 
in this case even superficially shows a tremendous diversity 
between the contentions of the prosecutor and the defense. 
Much of the evidence is completely contradictory and other 
evidence is inconclusive. The credibility of Robert Jones and 
Beverly Jones is the single most important factor for any jury 
to consider in deciding this case. Prejudicial errors which 
effect this credibility cannot be tolerated. Likewise, the 
closeness of this case requires a strict scrutiny of all legal 
principles utilized in the trial. Since intent was a critical 
issue for both parties, it was imperative that proper jury 
instructions be given and that an unbiased jury be selected 
which would weigh this intent fairly. For the preceding 
reasons, therefore, it is respectfully requested that this 
matter be remanded for new trial. 
DATED this S1^ day of August, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rv A f o ^ l^Q^ . 
oy 





-18-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to David 
L. Wilkinson, attorney for respondent, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on the 5th day of August, 1986. 
iW^VW 
MAX D. WHEELER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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